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he non-identity problem (NIP) is a severe problem for 
the ethics of future people: Today’s acts can influence 
the identity of future people.1 If so, the common  moral 
reasoning that we ought to avoid making people worse 
off and, thus, harming them fails with respect to these future peo-
ple. The NIP is not a problem for all moral theories. But it is 
highly pertinent for all moral theories that adopt, or partly incor-
porate, a
Comparative Personal View
The moral status of an act A necessarily depends on the com-
parative relation between a property F of some person P as a 
consequence of A and F of P as a consequence of the relevant 
alternative(s).
Comparative Personal Views compare a particular person’s pro p-
erty as a result of one action with the property of the very same 
person as a result of the alternatives. Therefore, they are subject 
to the NIP: If an act affects who will exist in the future, some 
particular person P who would exist as a consequence of that act 
would not exist in the relevant alternative(s). And since a pro p-
erty cannot exist without the bearer of the property, there is no 
property F of P as a consequence of the relevant alternative(s) 
that the property F of P as a consequence of A could be com-
pared with.2 Thus, Comparative Personal Views do not produce 
any wrong-making features with respect to non-identical future 
persons. They do not apply to (the parts of ) actions that influence 
the identity of future people. 
How serious is the problem? Melinda Roberts and Jörg Tremmel 
argue that it is small, because the effect on the identities of future 
people is rather insignificant: the existence of virtually every per-
son is highly precarious given all the causal influence that contrib-
ute to a particular person coming into existence. Melinda Roberts 
argues from this that for most acts there would be a chance that 
some person exists in some alternative that is accessible to the 
agent.3 Therefore, we would need to take into account the very 
small chances that particular persons exist in an alternative any-
way and assess the acts on basis of expected comparisons of peo-
ple’s F-extents. Jörg Tremmel, by contrast, insists that many acts 
would play just one very small causal role leading to the existence 
of a particular person. Given the insignificant causal influence of 
a particular act on the existence of people, we could justifiably 
ignore the very small chances for a particular person coming into 
existence as a consequence of a particular act.4 If successful, both 
reasonings would massively reduce the scope of the NIP. It would 
not be a serious, or real-world problem, then.
However, these counterarguments overlook the specific char-
acteristics of Comparative Personal Views. First, the very small 
chances of each particular person coming into existence exponen-
tiate, because for a particular person’s property to be compared, 
the person needs to exist as a consequence of the act and as a 
consequence of at least one alternative. And the chance that a 
person would exist as a consequence of two acts is the product 
of both these very small chances. Hence, if each particular act 
causes a particular person to exist with only very small chances, 
the chances that this very person would exist as a consequence 
of an act and as a consequence of the alternative that is available 
to the agent are astronomically small. But even if it were true for 
each act that some people could exist independently of choosing 
this act, (many) other people’s identities would still be influenced 
by each particular act. Insisting here that this kind of influence is 
negligible does not help either. For such a move just amounts to 
a rejection of Comparative Personal Views: the status of an act 
would not depend on the relation between P’s F as a consequence 
of A and P’s F as a consequence of the relevant alternative any-
more. Hence, the NIP is still a problem for Comparative Personal 
Views. They fail to take into account the morally relevant proper-
ties of those people whose identities are nevertheless altered by an 
act and, thus, disregard the moral significance of the properties of 
still quite many future people.
Second, Comparative Personal Views compare the relevant alterna-
tive courses of action that are available to the agent. Causal factors 
previous to a particular act do not reduce the morally relevant causal 
effect of that act on the existence of particular individuals. They are 
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irrelevant because they bear on the consequences of all available al-
ternatives likewise. Hence, an act influences whether a person exists 
or not independently of previous causal dependencies. Subsequent 
causal factors may additionally alter the identity of future people, 
though. But they do not countervail the causal effect of an act on 
the identities. Subsequent causal factors would rather further ex-
tend the range of possible people. If so, the particular act still de-
termines the set of possible people from which one particular person 
then comes into existence as a consequence of the subsequent causal 
factors. And if the set of possible people determined by an act and 
the set of possible people determined by the act’s alternative are dis-
junct, there is no person who could have existed as a consequence of 
the act and as a consequence of the alternative act. Thus, a person’s 
existence still hinges on that very act.
Robert’s and Tremmel’s attempts to diminish the practical signif-
icance of the NIP fail. Tremmel’s alleged counterargument even 
highlights the severity of the problem: many events influence the 
particular identities of future people. Hence, virtually every act 
can have tremendous effects on the existence of future people; not 
just acts that are large in scale such as Parfit’s depletion example5 
or his energy policy example.6
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